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 Abstract This article explores the political economy of the French Socialist Party 
(PS), beginning with the neo-liberal U-turn of 1983. It then charts the re-evaluation of 
the PS's political economic foundations after the 1993 defeat, the rejection of the neo-
liberal ‘pensée unique’, and the rehabilitation of a broadly Keynesian frame of 
reference. The article goes on to explore how this shift has fed through into the Jospin 
government's policy and positions at both the national and international level. It 
explores aspirations to reinvent the EU as a Keynesian social democratic 'policy 
space', and at the national level, employment, macroeconomic, and structural policies.  
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This article explores the political economy of the Jospin government and assesses the 
approach known as left-wing Realism (Réalisme de Gauche)  as a potentially viable 
social democratic economic strategy. In order to fully understand Réalisme de 
Gauche, a firm grasp of the logic and limits of the economic strategy pursued by the 
PS in the decade after the U-turn of 1983 is necessary. The paper thus begins by 
exploring how the French Socialist Party internalised the U-turn of 1983, a pivotal 
moment in the political economy of French Socialism, heralding a neo-liberal shift 
towards competitive disinflation. 
 
In the aftermath of the 1993 defeat, the party engaged in a process of auto-critique. A 
central theme of this auto-critique  involved challenging of the pensée unique, which 
was the French translation of the dominant neo-liberal economic orthodoxy. This 
questioning of received economic wisdom engendered a new diagnosis of France’s 
key economic problem, as well as a re-evaluation of the degree of volontarisme (state 
activism) possible in the international economic context of the 1990s. These two 
elements, the challenging of the dominant economic orthodoxy, and its corollary, the 
changing diagnosis of the economic problem, informed a particular reading of the 
implications of globalisation for social democratic economic strategy. The PS has 
been anxious to plot a course other than accommodation with neo-liberal orthodoxy 
on the assumption that 'there is no alternative.' There is an insistence upon the 
existence of room to manoeuvre a concept central to Réalisme de Gauche.  
 
Réalisme de Gauche is built upon non neo-liberal economic foundations. The Jospin 
Government’s neo-Keynesianism dovetails with the insistence upon the ‘active state’, 
and a critical engagement with globalisation. By conceiving of globalisation not as 
ineluctable but contested, the Jospin Government argues that a significant degree of 
state interventionism remains possible despite constraining global forces, based on a 
broadly Keynesian approach to the economy. The Government has demonstrated a 
commitment to ‘the mobilisation of society towards a redefinition of public power – 
national and international – in favour of job creation.’1 This involves, at both national 
and supra-national level a new approach to the key objective of employment creation. 
 
In the final section  - which looks briefly at  employment policy, welfare policy, 
macro-economic policy and  fiscal policy – we highlight the increased propensity  of 
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the Jospin government to explore activist possibilities, and also the accepted limits of 
such activism . 
 
Globalisation, Social Democracy, and Réalisme de Gauche 
 
The Mitterrand era began in 1981 with an ambitious counter-cyclical demand-boost 
and a dash for growth in the context of a world slump, termed by Hall, ‘redistributive 
Keynesianism’2 However, within two years, external pressures, including 
significantly the conditions of EMS membership, and a series of financial crises 
undermined this macro-economic stance. Its reversal began as early as June 1982, but 
the coup de grace was administered in March 1983. 3 The episode was widely 
interpreted, both within French Socialism and beyond, as a demonstration of the 
incompatibility of Keynesian social democracy and the new international political 
economic order of the post-Bretton Woods world. 
 
The ‘failure’ of the Mitterrand experiment attested to the difficulties social democrats 
faced in attempting to control their national economic space in the new international 
political economic context. For some, this meant globalisation had rendered social 
democracy unworkable. 4 More sober analyses recognised the impact of globalisation 
to be ambiguous. 5 Globalisation neither ‘mandates’ nor ‘prohibits’ policies, but 
changes the structure of costs and opportunities of particular strategies. The room to 
manoeuvre for social democratic governments is (and ever was) quite small, but 
globalisation does not press upon actors irresistible policy formulation. Pierson’s 
account insists upon ‘complex interplay and feedback as politicians seek to anticipate 
markets and market actors seek to second-guess the politicians.’ He insists that ‘there 
are still choices to be made – even if these have become more expensive or more 
difficult to mobilize.’ 6 There is real constraint, but also possible opportunity. We 
need not delve at length into the detail of that ‘regime defining’ choice of 1983, it has 
been done admirably elsewhere. 7 However, it should be recalled that the so-called 
autre politique offered an alternative, rooted in the established referential of French 
economic policy-making.  
 
That globalisation does not, in any straightforward manner, ‘impose’ financial 
discipline or neo-liberal policy agendas on social democratic governments lies at the 
 3
heart of the political eocnomy of the Jospin government . Jospin asserts, ‘we do not 
give in to the fatalistic idea that the neo-liberal capitalist model is the only one 
available. On the contrary, we can shape the world according to our values.’8 
Réalisme de Gauche suggests that globalisation does not preclude social democratic 
policy activism. Globalisation, according to Jospin, ‘favours global growth, but is 
accompanied by growing of inequalities … it liberates energies, but also negative 
forces which must be mastered.’9 Regulation is, Jospin argues, the ‘political 
globalisation’ required in this new context; ‘wherever there is a risk that only the law 
of the strongest may apply, or where private interests threaten the general interest, or 
where the search for short term profit undermines social justice and damages the 
environment, States must define the ‘rules of the game’.’10
 
Jospin’s primary concern is with international financial regulation – where he urges 
the Bretton-Woods institutions to ‘pursue their evolution’ towards re-regulation of the 
international political economy, beginning with closer supervision of hedge funds and 
off-shore banking centres. Here Jospin repeats oft-cited calls for a Tobin Tax on 
volatile speculative capital flows, and urges the IMF, of all institutions, to engage in 
‘reflection’ on encouraging greater ‘viscosity’ in the movement of capital as a source 
of stability. 11We could, Jospin notes, ‘let the supposedly natural laws of economics 
guide the evolution of our societies, and in so doing, abdicate our political 
responsibilities. On the contrary, we could seek to re-orient the forces at work in the 
globalisation of economic activity.’ 12 No prizes for guessing which he favours. 
 
For all the talk of voluntarisme and re-regulation, the 1983 U-turn nevertheless 
enforced upon French Socialists a recognition of external constraints and reduced 
room to manoeuvre in an international economic order where the ‘embedded 
liberalism’ of the Bretton Woods had ceased to insulate national economies. 
Emmanuelli and Chevènement referred to 1983 as ‘notre Bad Godesberg’.13 For all 
those who experienced at first hand the currency crises provoked by the mismatch 
between domestic economic priorities and strategy, and international economic 
context, 1983 was a salutary lesson into the limited nature of economic sovereignty. 
The ‘realism’ and pragmatism which underpins the political economy of the Jospin 
Government (notably in its ‘consolidation’ of public finances) is testament to the 
integration of these ‘limits of the possible’ into its frame of reference. 
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 Competitive Disinflation 
 
What is most striking about the 1983 U-turn and the subsequent evolution of French 
Socialist macro-economic policy is the abandonment of the Keynesian paradigm as 
the dominant referential through which French Socialists analysed unemployment and 
macroeconomic policy and the relationship between the two. This engendered a shift 
of priorities in macroeconomic policy, relegating full employment to a distant future 
aspiration, and promoting tackling inflation to priority number one. The new 
hierarchy of priorities owed a good deal more to the (neo-liberal) new classical school 
than it did to Keynesian insights into the role of the state in maximising the level of 
employment within the economy. Competitive disinflation, as the new policy became 
known, was to an extent a reflection of changed international political economic 
realities. However, the new direction also reflected the singular reading of the 
implications of such changed realities by an elite in the capture of the ‘pensée 
unique’, the neo-liberal economic orthodoxy in its French articulation. 
 
The logic of competitive disinflation is simple: ‘under fixed exchange rates, a country 
with higher inflation loses competitiveness, and as a result demand for output falls. 
An increase in unemployment follows which makes inflation decrease sufficiently so 
that competitiveness is eventually re-established.’ 14 The strategy was a crucial 
determinant of all aspects of economic policy from 1983 onwards. Competitive 
disinflation comprised three elements. First, the nominal stability of the franc fort, 
pegged to the DM. Second, wage restraint and wage discipline, initially through a de-
indexation of wages, which aimed to but tackle inflation, and also to shift added value 
from labour to capital, thereby improving profitability (and investment). The third 
priority was that of public deficit reduction, aiming to bolster financial credibility. 15 
Two aspects of competitive disinflation stand out:  its emulation of German model, 
and the place of financial credibility (and the attendant accommodation to dominant 
neo-liberal orthodoxy) as its lynch pin. Monetary policy was no longer used as an 
instrument of reflation, activist fiscal policy was not countenanced, and ‘Keynesian’ 
inspired automatic stabilisers were partially ‘turned off’. 16
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One Jospin Government advisor observed that  ‘the compliment to competitive 
disinflation was deregulation, to increase competition, and the competitivity of firms, 
and of the French financial system.’17 Microeconomic manoeuvres would bring 
market discipline to bear in order to improve the competitivity of French firms in the 
context of tight budgetary discipline and a strong currency. Such measures included 
the liberalisation of prices and the lifting of restrictions on foreign exchange 
transactions. Competitive devaluation, and its attendant ‘moral hazard’ problems, had 
been removed. Restructuring and adjustment was achieved through market 
mechanisms, with firms obliged to pay extremely close attention to their labour and 
‘social wage’ costs and prices. Tackling unemployment had been one of the main 
priorities of economic policy between 1981 and 1983. After the U-turn, rising 
unemployment became instead the principle adjustment mechanism of the troubled 
French economy, about which the Government tacitly accepted it could do little.  
 
Competitive disinflation ‘worked’ in the sense that credibility was eventually 
restored, and the competitiveness of French firms improved in the 1990s.  But there 
were many unintended consequences. For example, whilst wages were brought down 
very significantly, reducing production costs, the dampening effect this would have 
on demand was not factored in to the model. The flaws of competitive disinflation are 
more damningly demonstrated by its impact on French economy and society in the 15 
years following the U-turn, which saw structural unemployment rocket.  18 Problems 
were compounded by the ‘asymmetric dependency’ of Franco-German economic 
relations in the post-reunification period. Germany decided to finance reunification 
through European borrowing, and, accordingly, set very high interest rates, which 
French rates were constrained to shadow, discouraging productive investment. This 
further crippled France’s already sluggish growth.  
 
The strategy of competitive disinflation was clearly running counter to the declared 
justification of long-term job creation. Employment priorities suggested the urgent 
need for a reduction of interest rates, and a devaluation of the Franc vis-à-vis the 
Deutschmark. However, employment was so low on the macroeconomic hierarchy of 
priorities, and the competitive disinflation referential with its attendant sound money 
ethos was so dominant, that when the Germans proposed a re-alignment of parities 
within the EMS, revaluing the Mark, Bérégovoy refused. 19 The market medicine was 
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killing the patient. Austerity dampened demand, meanwhile persistent high 
unemployment produced ‘hysteresis’ effects, with low activity and slow capital 
accumulation triggering bankruptcies, and destroying productive capacity. The 
structural unemployment rate was ‘ratcheted’ up. This scenario obtained between 
1983, when unemployment stood at 8.3 per cent, until 1997, when it exceeded 12.6 
per cent: ‘The strategy followed has been, quite simply, to achieve disinflation and 
increased competitiveness through higher unemployment.’ 20
 
Shifting the Policy Paradigm: From Pensée Unique to Réalisme de Gauche 
 
Electorally, the manifest failure of a decade of Socialist Government to make any 
impression on the soaring unemployment figures was devastating. This, acting in 
tandem with widespread disdain for a sleaze-ridden Socialist elite, heralded the 
biggest defeat in the history of French Socialism in 1993.21 The failure of the 
Bérégovoy government, like those before it, to deliver on its pledge to reduce 
unemployment led to a re-evaluation of Socialist economic strategy. Too much, it was 
felt, had been sacrificed at the altar of economic orthodoxy, with resultant gains in 
financial credibility and profitability, but not jobs.  
 
The set the tone for the message Jospin repeated in his 1995 Presidential manifesto:  
 
‘We must learn the lessons of the past, in order to instigate the reorientations of 
economic policy which today are necessary and possible without increasing 
public deficit, nor putting our currency, our external balances, or the 
competitivity of our firms in peril. I reject the idea that the state is powerless, 
and believe that it should deploy all its capacities to aid job creation.’22  
 
Jospin couches his scepticism about neo-liberal orthodoxy in ‘realist’ terms.  Certain 
parameters for action, such as a commitment to monetary stability, are accepted, 
given the context of an interdependent and relatively open economy and deregulated 
financial markets. However, the precise location of the limits of the possible is 
contested. The need to be seen to be credible by investors and speculators does not 
rule out policy activism. Thus questioning of the dominant economic orthodoxy 
informs the philosophical foundation of the new strategy; an insistence upon the 
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existence of ‘marges de manoeuvre’, and a belief that all the means of tackling 
unemployment have not yet been explored. The existence of room to manoeuvre was 
demonstrated, for example, by the 15% tax levied on non-reinvested profits by the 
Jospin government in 1997, justified in terms of the need to reduce the budget deficit 
in order to meet the convergence criteria.23 In calling for the less restrictive 
conception of the convergence criteria,24 Moscovici questions ‘the erroneous 
conviction that the 3% level is an absolute barrier, separating monetary virtue from 
vice’. 25 A similar approach has subsequently been taken to the Growth and Stability 
Pact (see David Howarth’s article in this issue)  
 
With the calling into question of competitive disinflation came also the questioning of 
its theoretical foundations, and the canon from which they are drawn. The Jospin 
Government was keen to renew with the influence of economic thought of broadly 
Keynesian origin within the PS. Although remaining within the framework of a 
commitment to stability, the advocated strategy has a Keynesian feel to it. Firms must 
anticipate ‘solvent’ levels of demand – which presupposes mass consumption, and 
therefore higher salaries. This explains the commitment to limited redistribution from 
capital to labour, particularly towards those lower earners with a higher propensity to 
spend, albeit tempered by an appreciation of the importance of the profitability and 
competitiveness of firms. Whilst careful to point out that this is not a return to old-
style Keynesian policies, the different ideological suppositions under-pinning this 
different view of the economy are explicitly highlighted. 26
 
The challenging of the dominant economic orthodoxy, and its corollary, the changing 
diagnosis of the economic problem, inform a particular reading of the implications of 
globalisation for social democratic economic strategy - Réalisme de Gauche. Jospin 
rejects ‘finding a middle way between social democracy and neo-liberalism’. The idea 
of capitalism as, ‘a force that moves, but does not know where it is going’ informs the 
view that, ‘the regulation of capitalism is essential and requires an active state.’ 27 The 
French state, institutionalising the values of solidarity, co-operation and inclusion 
should act, it is argued, as a counterweight to the market to promote social cohesion. 
Greater efficiency is called for in state redistribution policies, necessitating 
fundamental reform of the tax system ‘to increase social justice, ceasing to privilege 
capital in order to favour labour, and to preserve solidarity.’ 28 Thus Réalisme de 
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Gauche reconciles an enduring dirigiste dimension with growing enthusiasm for the 
market. As Jospin notes, ‘the concept of volontarisme (or an active state) does not set 
up the state in opposition to the market, but instead creates a new alliance between the 
two.’29
 
At the heart of Réalisme de Gauche is a more critical engagement with the neo-liberal 
view of capitalist market economy, and an unequivocal attachment to a recognisably 
social democratic role for state. This rejects the orthodox assumption that 'there is no 
alternative', and is predicated on Jospin’s critical engagement with globalisation 
outlined above. Accordingly, the Jospin Government has developed a ‘dual-level’ 
approach to employment strategy emphasising expanding ‘room to manoeuvre’ 
through European economic policy co-ordination in tandem with domestic 
voluntarisme. 
 
In the wake of the 1983 U-turn, and the Fontainebleu summit which saw the process 
of European integration actively pursued with a renewed vigour by Mitterrand, the 
PS’s internationalism underwent a thorough Europeanisation. This Europeanisation 
entailed a realisation that France is an integral part of the EC, and given the degree of 
interdependence of the European economies, the French nation state must be 
conceived as intrinsically part of a greater European whole. President Mitterrand’s 
lead on Europe was also a means of filling the ‘gap’ left by the end of transcendental 
rhetoric and the impact of governing constraints on maximalist programmes. The 
party needed to regain its sense of engagement in social transformation and rediscover 
some doctrinal and programmatic coherence. Enthusiasts saw advancing European 
construction as an appropriately large-scale reformist project to substitute for the 
policies of Projet Socialiste. 
 
Given the constraints on national economic management which preclude Keynesian 
macro-policy approaches, international co-operation and co-ordination is an 
increasingly important component of social democratic economic strategy. Thus it is 
increasingly at the European level that French Socialists have sought to rearticulate 
Keynesian insights, and resolve the tensions between globalisation and social 
democracy. The conviction is widely held that European co-operation and 
integration offers the only viable ‘response’ to globalisation. This pursuit of ‘public 
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goods’ unattainable at the national level at EU level has been a central strand of 
French Socialist thinking in recent years. It is exemplified in the ‘Euro-Keynesian’ 
aspects of the Delors White Paper, which advocates a co-ordinated European 
economic expansion, boosting employment across the continent. 30
 
The Jospin Government has championed such reforms, and sought to institutionalise 
more thoroughgoing employment goals within the process of European construction. 
Jospin seeks a new path to full employment, a dual-level strategy combining 
national level reforms with a re-orientation of the process of economic integration 
towards greater emphasis on employment. The aim is for a negotiated rebalancing of 
the policy mix, hoping to generate co-ordinated fiscal, monetary, and structural 
policies across the EU  to be geared towards jobs and growth. The strategy is one of 
continued critical engagement from within,  arguing at every turn for reorientations, 
such as a European Jobs and Growth Pact (at Amsterdam), a European Growth fund 
(at Portschach) and the embryonic formulation of a common European employment 
strategy (at the Luxembourg and Cardiff jobs summits).  
 
The Policy Profile of the Jospin Government: Domestic voluntarisme?  
 
At the national level, Réalisme de Gauche involves an insistence that room to 
manoeuvre does exist, and therefore policy activism is possible. Despite the 
constraints of an increasingly open economy, the Jospin Government has sought to 
'rehabilitate’ activist economic policy. A broadly Keynesian rationale31, stimulating 
purchasing power to increase the growth potential of the French economy, facilitating 
a boost in consumption and investment, informs a set of redistributive fiscal measures, 
as well as social exclusion measures, all framed in egalitarian terms. We now 
demonstrate the coherence of the Jospin government’s approach in the fields of 
Welfare, Employment and Macro-economic policy.  
 
Jospin’s egalitarian rhetoric, although not always matched by policy outcomes, should 
be set against the backdrop of French welfare provision which has sustained an ever-
growing source of redistribution in terms of social welfare. France’s welfare state is 
the largest outside Scandinavia. Social security spending was 30 % of GDP in 1995.32 
Welfare policy plays a role in employment policy—but its fundamental aim is 
 10
redistribution. The logic underpinning family allowances in France, for example, has 
shifted markedly in the last 20 years towards redistribution from wealthy to poor. 33 
The Jospin government’s biggest welfare achievement has been the establishment of 
universal health cover. This makes health cover available to the disadvantaged free of 
charge, as Levy notes, ‘by providing free supplementary health insurance on a means-
tested basis to an estimated 6 million people (those living on less than 3500 francs per 
month for a single individual, 7700 francs for a family of four).’34 That said, the 
Jospin government’s attempts to redistribute in favour the poor is not easy to 
reconcile to a complex social insurance based French welfare state which has tended 
to prioritise contribution-based income maintenance above universalistic 
redistribution. 35
 
In terms of employment policy, the Jospin Government sees the state’s role as the 
guarantor of employment. The Party’s reflection on its objectives in the decade ahead 
recently affirmed a strong commitment to establishing ‘a society of full employment .. 
and the amelioration of the quality of employment.’36 Accordingly, its activist 
employment policy informs a multi-pronged strategy which involves a state regulated 
reduction of the working week, the creating of jobs for urban and environmental 
regeneration, and shifting incentives in the labour market through fiscal policy. Most 
of the tax and social security reductions enacted by the Jospin government (in 
particular tax reductions on low or modest incomes) have had  the dual aim of 
assisting employment creation as well as boosting purchasing power. Nowhere is the 
state’s enduring role in the job creating strategy more in evidence than in the Jospin 
government’s state orchestrated shift to a 35 hour week, aiming to reduce 
unemployment and to have a redistributive effect between labour and capital. The 
French law emphasises job creation, with state aid in the form of reductions in social 
security contributions offered to firms creating new jobs as a result of the reduction of 
the working week. The fixed levels of these state financial aids means that they will 
be relatively more generous for lower earners. These themes are developed in more 
detail by  Susan  Milner in the current issue.  
 
The active labour market measures adopted,  in conjunction with a favourable 
macroeconomic context provided by a ‘soft’ euro, have enabled the Jospin 
government to claim conspicuous successes on the employment front. Unemployment 
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fell below 10 per cent in 2001, with a total of 2,371,300 unemployed—down from 3.2 
million (12.5 per cent) when Jospin took office. On current trends, unemployment is 
set to dip below 9 per cent by the end of next year.37 Jospin now talks of the creation 
of a full employment society—something no one on the French left has done since the 
dramatic policy U-turn of 1983. 
 
What about macro-economic policy?  This is described by one advisor of the Jospin 
Government  as ‘post-Keynesian’ . The Jospin Government prioritises ‘redistribution 
in favour of employment’. This involves fiscal redistribution in favour of lower 
earners to raise purchasing power, including tax reductions increasing households’ 
disposable income. The Government actively advocates growth through expansion of 
demand, and the redistributing of added value in favour of salaried workers. A key 
budgetary objective of Jospin’s governments has been to reinforce growth through tax 
and social security reductions to assist employment creation and boost purchasing 
power. As Muet notes, ‘macroeconomic policies are essential and play a key role in 
stimulating growth and jobs … structural policies are only efficient in a context of 
rising demand. It is pointless to tackle unemployment with structural policies alone.’38 
Budgetary reflation has been abandoned, but other measures, drawing on other 
Keynesian insights, are retained. The Jospin Government is keenly aware of the need 
to redistribute to lower income brackets with a higher propensity to spend as a means 
of keeping demand buoyant.39  
 
The Jospin Government has certainly achieved some redistribution, raising the SMIC 
(minimum wage) by 4 per cent (well above the rate of inflation) on entering office. In 
December 1998, the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion and two similar minimum income 
guarantees were raised by 3 per cent, backdated a year. While redistributing wealth to 
low and non-earners hinted at the ‘neo-Keynesianism’ of Réalisme de gauche, both 
redistribution and the consumption boost were kept within quite tight limits in the 
face of macroeconomic constraints. Indeed, Jospin’s pragmatic realism held back 
SMIC increases to the legal minimum of 3.2 per cent in 1999 and 2000, despite a 
context of strong economic growth.  
 
Reform to and augmentation of the role of the Contribution Sociale Généralisée 
(CSG) have been conspicuous mechanisms of the Jospin Government’s redistributive 
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agenda. This is part of a wider attempt to shift the logic of welfare funding in France. 
The 1998 budget increased the CSG – applied to all earnings and not just wages – 
from 3.4% to 7.5%, and at the same time decreased workers contributions to health 
insurance from 5.5% to 0.75%. According to Levy, ‘although the fiscal yield was 
unchanged, the reform provided the average worker with a 1.1% gain in purchasing 
power; conversely it added to the tax bill of those (primarily, the affluent) who derive 
earnings from property or capital.’40 Furthermore, the 2000-2003 budget reforms will 
make the CSG more progressive, reducing the CSG for low earners, and exempting 
those on the minimum wage from the CSG by 2003. There has also been 
‘progressive’ reform to make the Solidarity Tax on Wealth (ISF) more effective. It 
was increased in the 1998 budget, its coverage was extended to close a number of 
loopholes, and a new band introduced in the 1999 budget.41
 
More recently, income tax cuts in March and September 2000 disproportionately 
favoured low and non-earners.42 The reorganisation of income tax from 2000 to 2003, 
including a reduction in income tax rates for all income bands—including the 
highest—seem to have a more populist logic, given the ‘war chest’ provided by 
economic growth, and the proximity of the presidential election. That said, the Jospin 
government has made income tax more progressive, with the lightening of the load 
targeted particularly at the lower brackets.43
 
The context of these redistributive measures was a more generalised lightening of the 
fiscal load, in particular, on small and medium-sized firms. Illustrating the 
pragmatism and commitment to macroeconomic stability of the Jospin Government, 
much of the redistributive reform has been achieved through fiscal ‘cost-shuffling’. 
The 1998 budget, for example, involved a ‘revenue neutral reform that shifted the 
burden from low-income groups to high-income groups (leaving business 
unaffected).’44 Thus, redistributive commitments and egalitarian aspirations are 
tempered by ‘realist’ considerations, ‘redistribution does not override other 
considerations ... for the fruits of economic growth to be redistributed, there must first 
be growth.’ Such fruits have permitted tax cuts across the board. That said, 
progressive fiscal policy is constrained, not least because, ‘in the new global market 
we must ... ensure that our production base is competitive.’45
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The Jospin Government is perhaps best conceived as ‘reluctantly post-Keynesian’. 
Their ‘post-Keynesianism’ owes more to the constraints of the Growth and Stability 
Pact given membership of the Euro than to a changed analysis of the economy. Even 
here, the Jospin Government seeks to explore any ‘room to manoeuvre’ created by 
flexible interpretation of the ‘Growth and Stability’ pact46, benignly viewed as a 
credibility-bolstering ‘hedging’ rather than a disciplinary ‘binding’ mechanism. 
 
Nevertheless, the ‘external constraint’ of the global political economic context 
engenders close attention to the grandes équilibres of the French economy. Thus the 
‘medium term consolidation of the public finances’ (moves towards budget balancing) 
remains a central objective. This is understood to necessitate public deficit reduction 
(down from 3.5% of GDP in 1997 to 1.4% in 2002), a reduction of public spending as 
a proportion of GDP (from 55 % in 1999 to 52. 3 % in 2001), and a reduction of debt 
as a proportion of GDP (59.3% of GDP in 1997, down to 56.3% in 2002).47 Such 
‘consolidation’ does not mean the Jospin Government has ceased to be social 
democratic, or has ‘swallowed’ neo-liberalism. Rather, as Dyson notes, the French 
Socialists ‘sought to draw a line between embracing rules of ‘sound’ public finance 
and money and taking on the whole apparatus of neo-liberal and monetarist policy 
discourse.’ 48
 
Returning to the earlier point about social democracy and globalisation, some of the 
changed parameters of economic policy-making relate to changed realities of the 
global economy. It is important to draw distinctions between different elements of 
economic policy packages, and recall that whilst certain aspects may be closely linked 
to neo-liberal policy agendas, others are perfectly compatible with social democratic 
ones. Whilst the credibility demanded by financial markets does have ideological 
dimensions, often rooted in a broadly neo-liberal view of economic activity, it is to an 
extent a reflection of changed economic realities. The Jospin Government faces the 
dilemma, common to all centre-left governments, of the desire to exercise discretion 
to pursue social democratic objectives, tempered by the need for government policies 
to be perceived as sound and sustainable. Within a framework of a commitment to 
macro-economic stability, there remains room for manoeuvre over the degree of 
‘orthodoxy’, as well as a whole range of other economic policy tools that may be 
exploited to prioritise ‘social democratic’ goals.  
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 The key point is that securing credibility through stability-centric macro policy 
stances is compatible with a wide range of different priorities in other areas of 
economic policy. Furthermore, such a commitment to stability does not condemn a 
social democratic government to budgetary immobilisme. The Government accepts 
that there are clear limitations on macro-economic policy, not least arising from 
membership of the Euro. Equally, however, the Jospin Government’s macro 
economic policy is not totally post-Keynesian.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
To what extent does the experience of the Jospin Government represent a new model 
of social democracy? If nothing else, this episode undermines the hubris surrounding 
the ‘end’ of social democracy, and indeed of Keynesianism. Jospin cites, ‘determined 
efforts to combat unemployment, through economic growth, a negotiated reduction in 
the working week to 35 hours and a broad-ranging plan for youth unemployment ... 
laws we have passed to combat all kinds of exclusion and to establish universal health 
cover’ as evidence of his Government’s ‘neo-Keynesian’ approach.49 In 
macroeconomic policy, leeway, provided in part by the position in the economic 
cycle, has facilitated a partially activist fiscal policy, achieving limited redistribution 
to both working and non-working poor. That said, the Jospin Government has been 
partially constrained, despite flexible interpretation, by the Growth and Stability Pact 
to limit activist intentions.  
 
In employment policy, the Jospin Government, whilst accepting the argument for 
increased temporal flexibility, rejects the idea that ‘globalisation’ necessitates 
increasing wage flexibility or separation rates. Instead, their labour market reforms 
involve prioritising negotiation and redistributing available work. France’s embedded 
welfare and labour market institutions continue to engender lower levels of wage 
inequality, and higher minimum standards than most of  her main comparators. Such 
egalitarian commitments have been clearly affirmed since 1997, notably with the 
introduction of universal health cover. Réalisme de gauche has combined an active 
role for the state, relatively generous welfare provision, limited labour market 
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flexibility, neo-Keynesian macroeconomics and enthusiasm for EU macroeconomic 
co-ordination, through which the Jospin’s Government has sought to entrench and 
defend the European Social Model, and boost jobs and growth  at the EU level. 
 
Some major issues surrounding retrenchment of the French welfare state, such as 
pension reform, remain outstanding (and intractable) problems ahead. However, 
perhaps a greater threat to the ‘model’ than this is the lack of a secure governing 
coalition underpinning Jospin. Unlike, say, Swedish Social democracy, the French 
Left has never enjoyed a reliable cross-class basis of support. Jospin himself concedes 
that the French Socialists have never been a mass party; ‘we do not have in France a 
strong tradition of negotiation and social dialogue ... We can experience wide-scale 
electoral successes followed by major setbacks because we do not draw our support 
from specific social foundations.’ 50 Thus the viability and sustainability is threatened 
not by any internal contradictions, but by the permanent electoral frailty of French 
Socialism, which could undermine many of the achievements of the last five years. 
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